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REPLY
This reply is directed to the Points of Argument raised by Plaintiff, Sharee
Rodgers, in her Brief.
POINT L
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOT MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.
In her brief, Plaintiff states in substance that the Defendants did not marshal the
evidence in support of the Jury Verdict. She then goes on to recite and summarize all of
the testimony of Plaintiff and all of the witness and concluding that that the testimony of
Plaintiff is adequate enough to support the Verdict.
The approach taken by Plaintiff totally ignores the Brief of Defendants and
paragraph 17 through 21 on page 11 and 12. When all the evidence recited by Plaintiff is
compared with the evidence and claims cited in the brief of Defendants, It will be seen
that Defendants have given full effect to all of the claims and evidence of the Plaintiff.
Nonetheless, as is clear from the brief of Defendants, all of the evidence of Plaintiff is
insufficient to support the Jury Verdict.
POINT II.
IT WAS NOT PROPER FOR COUNSEL TO READ PLAINTIFF'S NOTES
TO THE JURY IN CLOSING ARGUMENT.
Plaintiff kept a written log of certain events occurring on and after February 27,
2004, when she experienced water entering the residence through the basement floor.
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This written log was never offered or introduced in evidence. She did use the notes to
refresh her memory and did actually read some of the notes. It is her contention that since
she testified to certain matters of the notes, that her counsel had a right to read all of the
notes to the jury. We will never know whether they were read in whole or in part. We do
know reading the notes was a highly prejudicial error by the Court.
There is no basis in the Rules of Evidence.
Rule 803(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence reads:
"(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record
concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but
now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully
and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness
when the matter was fresh in the witness1 memory and to reflect that
knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be
read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
offered by an adverse party."
The rule specifically states that "If admitted, the memorandum or record may be
read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an
adverse party." In this case, the log book was never admitted into evidence and therefore
it could not be read into evidence and clearly it could not be read to the jury.
A textbook reference on this subject is contained in 29A Am. Jur. 2d §1272:
"Under the common law, personal diaries are generally, by
virtue of the rule against hearsay, inadmissible as evidence as proof
of facts stated in them. Such diaries, however, may be used to
refresh the memory of a witness, and may, where the witness has
entirely forgotten the facts but is able to swear that the diary entry
was correct at the time it was made, be used as independent evidence
as a past recollection recorded. Diaries have also been permitted into
evidence, notwithstanding their status as hearsay, where the
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declarant was unavailable as a witness and there was a reasonable
probability of the truth of the statements contained in them."
As stated above, as counsel for Plaintiff commenced reading the diary, Defendants
objected, the objection was overruled on the grounds that Plaintiff had testified to the
notes. Counsel then read part of the diary and this violated a fundamental rule. In Am.
Jur. 2d Trial §510 it is stated:
"During a closing argument, counsel may not "travel outside
the record" by arguing facts or matters not included in the evidence
of record. It is a fundamental rule that the argument of counsel
should at all times be confined to the questions in issue and the
evidence relating thereto, and such inferences, deductions, and
analogies as can reasonably and properly be drawn therefrom ..."
Again, the diary or record or log book of Plaintiff was never offered in evidence
and reading the document by counsel to the jury in closing argument was reversible error.
Obviously, it over emphasized the testimony of the Plaintiff and did incalculable damage.
POINT III.
THE MOTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE COURT.
The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, argued and denied early in the case
following initial discovery.
The lower court, as well as this court, was obligated to consider the evidence
relative to the signing of the contract as a matter of law that the individual defendants
could not be liable thereunder.
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Evidence heretofore presented in the case shows that Floyd Asher did not sign any
of the contracting documents and that Melanie Asher, his wife, signed only in her
capacity of trustee (See Addendum A to Defendants initial Brief). The
Acceptance/Counteroffer is signed Melanie Asher and below that is printed, "Melanie
Asher, trustee". Addendum No. 1 states in part as follows: "Between Sharee Rodgers, as
buyer, and Melanie Asher Trust, as seller".
Plaintiff, in her brief, has misstated the facts by failing to note to the Court that in
the Addendum it is stated "Melanie Asher Trust, as Seller".
Plaintiff read and understood the documents (after all, she is an executive with
multi-national company) and could not have been misled.
It is well to note also that Title 25-5-1 UCA 1953 provides:
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing."
The case of DBL Distributing v. One Cash LLC, 147 P3d. 478 (Utah App. 2006) is
distinguishable. That case involved a purchase contract and an individual guarantee and
is factually different from this case and involves a different rule of law.
The case of TWNInc. v. Michel, 66 P3d. 1031 (Utah App. 2003) has no bearing on
this case because the trust is identified as the Melanie Asher Trust.
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POINT IV.
FLOYD ASHER AND MELANIE ASHER ARE NOT LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF FOR EITHER BREACH OF CONTRACT OR
MISREPRESENTATION.
Under this point, Plaintiff claims that the several conveyances in the chain of title
of this residential lot between Floyd Asher and Melanie Asher, husband and wife, to the
Melanie Asher Trust and Asher Homestead, LLC, constitute some type of devious
conduct. The fact is, that the property transfers were made in order to obtain financing at
a lower interest rate. Plaintiff has not shown that any of those transfers are relevant
evidence because, for one reason, Plaintiff did not get involved in this property until
October, 2003. By that date, Asher Homestead, LLC was the record title owner. Plaintiff
received a Warranty Deed from Asher Homestead, LLC and her title is marketable and
insurable (TR. 288). Plaintiff is not suggesting that there are any defects in her title. If
Plaintiff did not want to do business with Asher Homestead, LLC, she could have walked
from the deal.
The only reason Plaintiff used this evidence is to convey to the jury unfounded
inference to fraud. Such an inference was prejudicial.
Plaintiff goes on to say that Floyd Asher was more involved in the case than
Melanie Asher. Floyd Asher did fill out the disclosure statement, but did not sign it.
Further, the fact that the disclosure shows the seller as Floyd and Melanie Asher, was
testified to by the agent, Nathan Hale, who stated that that was typed in there because he
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didn't know at the time who the seller would be. The disclosure was prepared before the
REPC was submitted to the Plaintiff for signature (TR. 286). Melanie Asher met
Plaintiff, but never had any conversation with her (TR. 501).
POINT V,
THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND ALTER
EGO WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE.
This issue (Instruction No. 26) has been sufficiently dealt with in Defendants
brief. Those arguments will not be repeated here. Suffice to say, all of the statements
made by Plaintiff under this point are pure rhetoric. One would expect that Plaintiff
would set forth under this point the items of evidence that supports her Instruction No. 26.
Didn't happen!
Plaintiff expansively states that the number of title transfers in the chain of title
amounts to fraud. The fact is that Plaintiff had no dealings with anyone other than the
Melanie Asher Trust and Asher Homestead, LLC. Further, Instruction 26 is limited
specifically to Asher Homestead, LLC. That entity appeared in this matter only to convey
a marketable title. Plaintiff accepted that title without objection. Now she appears to say
that the LLC is actually Floyd and Melanie Asher. There is no evidence to support that
statement and even further there is no evidence to show that Floyd Asher has any interest
in that entity. There is no evidence to show that any of the elements set forth in
Instruction No. 26 applied to Asher Homestead, LLC. Despite the fact that Plaintiff
introduced no evidence in this regard, she states in her brief on page 23 the following:
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"Instruction No. 26(a) listed eight (8) factors which could
determine the corporation be the alter ego of Defendants, all of
which factors are proved."
The fact is that there is no evidence to support any of the elements set forth in
Instruction No. 26.
POINT VI.

ON THE ISSUE OF FRAUD, PLAINTIFF HAS IGNORED THE
TESTIMONY OF HER AGENT, NATHAN HALE, WHO TOLD HER THAT
WATER HAD ENTERED THE BASEMENT.
Under this point in her brief, Plaintiff states:
"Sharee reasonably relied on the false statements since there
was no evidence at the time of her inspections of any noticeable
water damage."
However, during the inspections, her brother noticed a separation in the baseboard
in the wall in the bedroom. She was concerned about this problem and a statement was
put into the REPC that this separation would be repaired. It was at this time that a
conversation between Asher and Nathan Hale occurred. Asher told Mr. Hale that a small
amount of water had entered that bedroom through the window well in the basement. Mr.
Hale immediately contacted Plaintiff and informed her of that fact (TR. 277-279).
Her knowledge of water in the basement through the window well precludes
reliance on the Disclosure Statement that there had never been water or moisture in the
basement.
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POINT VII.
DAMAGES.
This matter has been covered in the brief of Defendants. It must be stated
however, that Plaintiff has failed to address the issue of guarantee contained in the bid of
Cox. His bid of $28,300.00 contained a guarantee which was not deducted from his bill.
His total bill of $28, 300.00 was obviously included in the jury verdict of $52,500.00.
Since the Timberline bill is flawed as not representing a correct element of damage for
restoration, it taints the entire damage verdict and must be reversed.
POINT VIII.
ATTORNEYS FEES.
Plaintiff has not addressed the elements of Cottonwood Mall Company v. Sine, 830
P.2d 266 (Utah 1992) which is the leading case in the matter of attorneys fees where a
party prevails on one issue and fails on another.
The attorneys fee affidavit contained substantial work relating to an issue on which
Plaintiff failed, namely, a claim for water on the north of the property which had not
migrated into the residence. This claim was interjected into the case by Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint. However, during the course of trial, Plaintiff failed on that point.
The failure to segregate her attorneys work between issues bars the recovery of attorneys
fees.
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POINT IX.
PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Mr. Tom Durant, the builder of this home, and also the contractor who repaired the
drainage problem in the window well after the water had entered the basement in 2002
and also observed the water entering the home in February 2004 under the basement
floor, some three months after Plaintiff purchased the home, testified that the water
entering from the window well and the water under the basement floor were coming from
separate sources. The hills in North Salt Lake had been dry for many years and then in
the winter of 2004, by an act of nature, springs and underground water began to appear all
over these foothills. Underground water had somehow gotten into the street and followed
the sewer line lateral and other utility lines under the property of Plaintiff and flooded
into the basement of the home. The water encountered in the Spring of 2002 came in
through a window well and was surface drainage. There is absolutely no connection
between the two.
This is a matter of proximate cause which is an element that Plaintiff must prove.
She must show that the failure to disclose to her that water had drained in through the
window well in 2002 and that Defendants failed to notify her of that fact before the sale,
that she is entitled to damage for a water condition totally unrelated to the window well
and caused by an act of nature that no one could have anticipated. Plaintiff has failed to
address this issue.
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As an example, assume a situation where a car dealer misrepresented to a buyer
that the radiator leaked but had been repaired, some months later the buyer returned and
said that you did not tell me about the radiator leak and now there is a leak of brake fluid
and you are liable for the repairs. Obviously, there is no connection between the two and
the Plaintiff would fail on the issue of proximate cause.
This is a closely parallel situation. Plaintiff has failed to prove that the failure of
Defendants to inform Plaintiff about the drainage in the basement bedroom requires them
to pay for the damage caused by an act of nature at a later time causing underground
water to enter the basement. There is a total disconnect between these two issues.
37 Am. Jur. 2d §293 reads:
"In order to maintain an action for fraud and deceit, it is
generally held to be necessary that the fraud be the real, direct,
proximate, and immediate cause of the injury or damage. In other
words, to sustain an action for deceit, the fraud and injury must be
connected and must bear to each other the relation of cause and
effect. In order for a false representation or statement to be
actionable or remediable, there must be a casual connection between
it and the damage sustained. Thus, in order to create remediable tort,
the damage must result proximately from the fraud."
Plaintiff must fail on the issue of proximate cause.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J_ day of October, 2007.
GARRETT & GARRETT

Edward M. Garrett
Attorney for Appellants
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